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Jewish Identity and Religious Revival in Post-Soviet Cuba1
The revival of the Cuban-Jewish community in the early 1990s illumi-
nates three aspects of religious identities in Cuban society. First, I will show 
through ethnographic data the ways in which religion – in this case, Juda-
ism – has adopted two roles: as social and economic aid networks, and as an 
international communication channel. Ethnographic data juxtaposed with 
global trends illustrates the particular ways in which these roles take shape 
as part of the reemergence of the community. Next, based on these two roles, 
I will argue that the Cuban-Jewish identity emerging from this specific his-
torical constellation is highly instrumental. This observed instrumentality 
stands in contrast to the primordial self-conception of the community of 
their Jewishness.  Finally, I will highlight the reciprocal relationship between 
local events and global trends.  
Any individual holds within their comprehensive self different ‘selves,’ 
potentially including a religious, national, ethnic, gendered, and familial 
self, among others. In short, any aspect by which a person chooses to de-
fine themselves is a self or an identity. At any given moment these multiple 
identities are in some sort of hierarchical order; a primary identity will be 
the one most often referred to and expressed while all the rest are in various 
degrees of subordination to the primary identity, and can be referred to as 
sub-identities. According to the instrumental interpretation of identity, so-
cial circumstances determine which of the identities will become the most 
relevant to a person’s life in a given moment – that is, a primary identity. In 
order to apply this concept to the Cuban case, we can theorize that religious 
identities gained importance within the Cuban milieu once the national Cu-
ban identity began to lose its standing as a bridge to global society and, as a 
national identity, became less stridently anti-religious. 
Compared to the period prior to the 1800s, today’s religion no longer 
present itself primarily as a political power but rather as a social network2. 
In addition, it is a channel of communication outside diplomacy that tran-
scends state borders; as such, religion emerges as a valuable tool in the age 
of globalization3. The general reframing of religion as a social force instead 
of a political force is evident in the local context of religion’s changing role in 
Cuban society as result of historical events such as the Cuban revolution of 
1959 and the economic crisis in the 1990s. 
In this essay I will examine and discuss three aspects of religious identi-
ties in Cuban society in both local and global historical contexts. First, it will 
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demonstrate through ethnographic data the ways in which religion – in this 
case, Judaism – has adopted two roles: one, as social and economic aid net-
work, and two, as a communication channel with the international commu-
nity in general and world Jewry in particular. Next, based on these two roles, 
the discussion will argue that the Cuban-Jewish identity emerging from this 
specific historical constellation is highly instrumental. This observed instru-
mentality stands in contrast to the primordial self-conception of the commu-
nity of their Jewishness. Finally, the data highlight the reciprocal relationship 
between local events and global trends. 
Instrumentalism and primordialism, a dialectic duo, are two ends of a 
spectrum on which we can situate the way identity is conceived. Identity can 
be seen as an intrinsic characteristic of a person or a group, as it is for the 
primordialists, or as part of the social survival kit, an instrument to navigate 
social interactions. An instrumentalist approach to the analysis of identity 
highlights the function identity serves in a person’s life, helping individuals 
adapt to circumstances. 
In the academic debate on identity, in the case of ethnic identity, a pri-
mordial interpretation of ethnicity assumes the constant existence of an eth-
nic entity4. Ethnicity, in the primordial point of view, is an inherent, relative-
ly unchanging attribute of identity both collectively and personally. Geertz 
defines the kinds of attachments that come with group membership as be-
ing intrinsic. These attachments are fundamental and non-negotiable. Geertz 
writes:
By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the 
“givens” … of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin con-
nection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from be-
ing born into a particular religious community, speaking a particu-
lar language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular 
social practices5. 
An instrumental interpretation of ethnic identity assumes that some 
sort of social change – many times resulting in crisis – brings forth a hier-
archical shift between one social identity and others. More generally, many 
social scientists situate the emergence of an ethnic category in a particular 
historical context6. 
Eriksen, in Ethnicity & Nationalism, writes “Ethnic identities…seem to 
tell people that although ‘all that is solid melts into air’…there is an unchang-
ing, stable core of ethnic belongingness which assures the individual of con-
tinuity with the past…”7. Castells identifies a similar component in identity 
formation. In his book The Power of Identity, Castells defines defensive iden-
tity, a term he coined, as “…an identity of retrenchment of the known against 
20
Efrat Sadras-Ron
the unpredictability of the unknown and uncontrollable…defenseless against a 
global whirlwind, people stuck to themselves…”8. By extension of these notions 
of ethnic identity, it is reasonable to consider the prioritization of a certain re-
ligious identity in a specifically turbulent time in Cuba, as an instrumentalist 
reaction to a crisis leading to social change, in which a religious network as-
sumed the roles of social and economic aid networks.
The Cuban government’s openness to religion could also be attributed to 
general decentralization trend resulting from globalization processes. Appad-
urai discusses the interplay between the nation-state and globalization trends, 
pointing out that nation-states can use global homogenization to shadow their 
own hegemonic strategies9. However, he is aware of the fact that nation-states 
are threatened by consumerism channeled beyond the national framework. 
Castells identifies three major areas in which the nation-state loses control 
in favor of international, state-independent powers: economics, information 
including media and electronic communication, and criminal activities10. In 
western ideoscapes, capitalism has taken root and is the leading economical 
ideology at present11. As a result, we see more worldwide conglomerates and the 
growing interdependency between world markets. In addition, we are witness-
ing a growing world-independent media. National governments lose more and 
more of their control over the information to which their citizens are exposed12. 
From this globalization framework, religion should be recognized as a 
universal in identity discourse which transcends national affiliations and re-
strictions. The majority of humanity defines itself in religious terms, assigning 
religious identities high ranking in the hierarchy of identities that comprise 
an individual. Furthermore, even secularity is considered by many as non-
religion, keeping secular people within the boundaries of religious identities 
(although secularity has been considered independently of religion in more 
recent discussions). 
In her book Friction, Tsing asserted that universals serve as mobile no-
tions able to transmit ‘packages of knowledge’ relevant to a discourse from lo-
cal to global context and vice versa13. She writes: “To turn to universals is to 
identify knowledge that moves – mobile and mobilizing – across localities and 
cultures. Whether it is seen as underlying or transcending cultural difference, 
the mission of the universal is to form bridges, roads, and channels of circula-
tion”14. Thus, universals can be seen as having a symbiotic relation with a dis-
course since they both construct and are constructed by it. As such, univ ersals 
can be modeled as both creators of subjects and motivators of action15. Indeed, 
Judaism in Cuba in the 1990s has been able to transmit knowledge across na-
tional boundaries, enlist more participants and get them to act in accordance 
to their new social environment. 
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The Local and Global Matrix
The ethnographic data presented in this essay was collected in two 
phases. Seventeen days of preliminary field work were conducted in Sep-
tember of 2004 in Havana. The remaining data collection was conducted 
during January and February 2006. I conducted twenty interviews with Cu-
ban-Jews, 80 percent of whom were residents of Havana, while the other 20 
percent where of three other communities in the interior: Guantanamo, San-
tiago de Cuba and Santa Clara. Due to time constraints, I chose to interview 
the leaders of the communities of the interior. Nonetheless, in Havana the 
larger number of participants (80 percent of the Cuban-Jewish population 
resides in the Havana metropolitan area) and the variety of activities made 
it possible to interview individuals with different levels of participation. The 
Havana sample included the leaders of the community, regular participants, 
and one interviewee was not affiliated with the community. The majority of 
interviewees were Cubans who chose consciously to identify themselves as 
Jews. Ten percent of the sample was composed of non-Jews connected to the 
community by marriage. 
Two main reasons influenced the choice of Cuba as the research site  – 
one relating generally to religion’s role in Cuba, and the second having to do 
more specifically with the Jewish case. First, the social and political history 
of Cuba created a unique backdrop for the Jewish communal revival. The 
fact that Cuba was for a long time the only socialist country in the western 
hemisphere  –  despite its rich informal capitalist economy in the form of a 
prosperous black market  –  makes Cuba a country that embodies two of the 
most influential ideologies in modern western thought. Furthermore, the 
major role religion played in Cuban society prior to the socialist revolution 
and the space created by its absence as of the 1959 revolution created an im-
portant aspect worth exploring. As a result, Cuban society provided unique 
grounds from which to explore the way religious identities adapt and trans-
form in modern western society. 
The second reason influencing the choice of Cuba as the site of research 
is the fact that its Jewish community had disintegrated into fragmented indi-
viduals with a thin base connecting them to their Jewish heritage. This fact 
made the revival of the community and the subsequent new identity unique. 
When the community reassembled in the 1990s, it developed from the vision 
of several individuals living in a secular social environment16. Participants in 
the different communities across the island were immersed in secular life-
style. Moreover, many of the participants had to be introduced to their heri-
tage. All of these historical circumstances made the Cuban-Jewish commu-
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nity a unique combination of secular and religious features while a product 
of western social history. 
The Cuban revolution declared itself – and, consequently, anyone asso-
ciated with it – to be atheist17. One could not be a member of the party and at 
the same time be openly associated with any kind of faith. As one communi-
ty member stated in the interview, an aspiring student could not declare her 
faith in any god, or gods, in fear that her university application would be de-
nied. This strict attitude of the revolution toward religious faith had its roots 
in the social structure of pre-revolutionary Cuba. The Catholic religion was 
an integral part of pre-revolutionary Cuba, as were the practitioners of San-
teria and other Afro-Cuban syncretism18. These religions were highly iden-
tified with specific social classes: Catholicism with the white elite and rul-
ing class, and Afro-Cuban religions with the poor, urban, black masses. Part 
of the general egalitarian agenda of the socialist revolution was the aim to 
eliminate these class-oriented, religion-specific identities in order to build 
an all-encompassing identity that did not have any specific class associated 
with it – the new Cuban identity19. In short, religion became the ‘enemy’ of 
the revolution – not as a result of specific atheist ideology, but rather due to 
social circumstances. 
At the time of the 1959 revolution in Cuba, Jews constituted a well-es-
tablished community. Most of the Jews were able to advance their social sta-
tus from immigrants to the privileged Cuban middle class. The community 
was comprised of three major factions: the Americanos, or English-speaking 
North Americans; the Polaco, or Yiddish-speaking Ashkenazim; and the Tur-
cos or Sephardim, who mainly spoke Ladino, the Jewish Spanish dialect20. 
These Cuban names for the different factions of the Jewish community were 
not necessarily a reflection of the geographical origin of their bearers.
The revolution of 1959 changed the Jewish landscape in Cuba. Much 
of the North American component left Cuba to return to the United States, 
followed by other wealthy members of the community. Within a year of the 
revolution, almost the entire congregation of North Americans had returned 
to the United States21. In addition to the departure of the majority of com-
munity members, the religious atmosphere in Cuba was radically altered. 
The official change of policy led to a decline in the Jewish community. Jewish 
schools were closed, and synagogues barely retained their buildings. Many 
Cuban-Jews were private business owners; although they did not leave Cuba 
immediately after the revolution, they watched the unfolding events closely. 
As community members dispersed, forgetting their Jewish roots, many mar-
ried non-Jews. 
23
Jewish Identity and Religious Revival in Post-Soviet Cuba
Given such a drastic decline in the Jewish population, coupled with 
the government’s aversion toward religion, the preservation of synagogues 
in Cuba required a conscious effort – especially during those years when the 
Jewish community as such ceased to exist. The story of the Hatikva (hope) 
synagogue in Santiago de Cuba is a wonderful tale of persistence and sur-
vival. In May 1979, a resolution of the Ministry of Justice put into effect the 
dissolution of the congregation. Indeed, the synagogue had not had a Min-
yan (ten Jewish adults, over the age of thirteen, needed for prayer) since 
1977, which meant that a religious service had not been held in the syna-
gogue since that time. After the 1979 resolution, all the sacred artifacts from 
the synagogue were packed up and shipped to a synagogue in Havana while 
the building was handed over to the Municipal Director of Culture and con-
verted into a dance studio. 
It was not until 1993 that the Santiago de Cuba community was inspired 
by the visit of a rabbi from Guadalajara, Mexico, and began negotiations for 
the retrieval of the synagogue’s building and the reconstitution of the syna-
gogue as a house of prayer. After two years of deliberations, the dream be-
came a reality; in 1995, the synagogue was consecrated, and a Sefer Torah 
(Scroll of the Law) was brought to the synagogue. An interesting fact is that, 
although architectural plans for the interior design of the synagogue were 
made, the old sacred arc – thought to be destroyed in the conversion of the 
synagogue into a dance studio – was found intact behind a wall. As a result, 
a reconstruction of the old synagogue was created through old photos22. 
The massive exodus of anti-revolutionary Cubans in the years that fol-
lowed the revolution included many of the religious leaders of all faiths. As a 
result, religious infrastructures and institutions were impaired, public acts of 
faith ceased, and believers retreated to private social spaces. Jewish institu-
tions did not escape this fate. However, because the Jewish community was 
relatively small, it did not pose a serious threat to the objectives of the revo-
lution; consequently, it was able to escape direct intervention of the revolu-
tionary government. By 1962, Communist Jews were in control of El Patro-
nato (the main synagogue and community center in Vedado, Havana) and 
headed the community; those in charge were mostly interested in promot-
ing a Communist agenda and paid little attention to the religious needs of 
the Cuban-Jewish community23. By 1965, the majority of Jews had left Cuba, 
driven out by the new socialist policies as well as rumors that Cubans might 
be prevented from leaving the country. Prior to the revitalization efforts in 
the early 1990s, the last Bar Mitzvah in Cuba was celebrated in 1973, and 
the last Jewish wedding was held in 1976. By the late1970s, almost all Jewish 
communal activity ceased24. 
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The 1980s brought with it new international realities that significantly 
influenced Cuban attitudes toward religions. The most prominent of these 
realities was the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe. Mikhail Gor-
bachev President of the Soviet Union, led the country through a series of re-
forms referred to as perestroika – a process that culminated in 1990, when 
the Communist Party officially gave up its monopoly on power. In subse-
quent years, the entire Communist social order disintegrated. The collapse 
of the Soviet Union shocked the economic and ideological foundations of 
Cuban society; in the international arena, Cuba was left isolated as its main 
economic allies, the European Eastern Bloc countries, were now fighting for 
their own economic survival. 
Ideologically, Cuba was left with no allies. Cubans refer to this time of 
crisis as the ‘special period,’ which lasted roughly throughout the last decade 
of the twentieth century25. In 1992, Cuba’s President, Fidel Castro, initiated a 
change in the constitution allowing Communist party members to be public-
ly associated with religious faiths, thereby reintroducing religion to the Cu-
ban public sphere. The Jewish religion is not the only faith to find new believ-
ers among Cubans; according to Pintado26, a similar religious rejuvenation 
occurred among both Christian and Afro-Cuban syncretism.
The story of the Hatikva synagogue serves as a symbolic representa-
tion for the story of religion in general in Cuba. The height of religious life 
in Cuba occurred prior to 1959. After the revolution, Cuban religious life 
went through a period of hiding in secluded private spaces to the point that 
it seemed as though it disappeared altogether – only to be rediscovered in 
the 1990s, reflecting connections to the past as well as demonstrating whole 
new ways of self-fulfillment. 
The Community at Present 
Dramatic changes have taken place in the community throughout time. 
Yet, a thread of continuity can be observed and traced, serving as evidence 
that we are indeed dealing with the revival of a community and not the es-
tablishment of a new community altogether. Such continuity is evident in the 
Cuban-Jewish marriage customs. 
Over time the way marriage functions as group delimiter changed, 
shifting from an emphasis on exclusion to one of inclusion. In the past, mar-
riage to a non-Jew led to alienation from the group. In the book The Chosen 
Island Jews in Cuba, Jose Altshuler Gutwert commented on his own mar-
riage to a non-Jew: “Even without being religious, it was a treif [not kosher] 
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marriage”27. Meanwhile, Enrique Oltuski Osacki expressed the same senti-
ment: “Marta’s family did not oppose our relationship. In Cuba, in mixed 
marriages, the opposition usually came from the Jewish side”28. Today, given 
that almost all unions are intermarriages, non-Jewish spouses are accepted 
in the community in all activities. They are eligible for all the benefits and 
are welcomed at the Hebrew classes, which are only open to the community. 
According to one interviewee  –  Eyal, a non-Jew who is married to Dana, a 
member of the community  –  “There are a lot of people that accept me and 
consider me as one of them, but up to a certain point.” 
Attitudes of the community towards education are another thread of 
continuity. Despite being one of the main causes of the revolutionary govern-
ment, education is limited in certain areas such as technology. As a general 
notion, education helps create a sense of uniqueness and worthiness among 
members of the Cuban-Jewish community, who take pride in being able to 
offer their youth a more sophisticated intellectual environment. Dana, an ac-
tive member of the community from the first days of it reemergence in the 
early 1990s, is a teacher in the Sunday school and an instructor in the youth 
organization. Dana stated in the interview that, “it is the community’s goal to 
show the youth the pride in being a professional.” Tal, Dana’s colleague and 
a past president of the youth organization, saw fit to emphasize that the ac-
tivities in the community’s center go beyond the regular hang-out and par-
tying that are prevalent in youth gatherings. Members of the community 
are offered education on a variety of subjects through two main channels: 
the Sunday school and courses offered by ORT – the worldwide Jewish vo-
cational school system. Both of these educational channels were operating 
in the hay day of the Cuban-Jewish community, in pre-revolutionary times. 
When the community reemerged in the 1990s both the Sunday school and 
ORT were reestablished, expressing the continual emphasis of the commu-
nity on education29.
Immediately following the Cuban revolution through the 1980s, a loss 
of interest in the Jewish identity occurred30. However, during the subsequent 
‘special period’ – the time of economic crisis and general uncertainty follow-
ing the collapse of the Soviet Union, which brought a need to reconsider one’s 
identity – a renewed interest emerged. The ‘special period’ created in Cuba a 
social void31. The new social and economic circumstances of the ‘special pe-
riod’ transformed the Jewish component of one’s entire identity into a prac-
tical survival tool in everyday life, thereby elevating its importance. 
The new Cuban sub-identities that emerged from the ‘special period’ 
can be classified as defensive identity using Castells’s category. In the face of 
the total collapse of the country’s economic system and international status 
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quo due to global events, religious institutions offered Cuba’s people a read-
ily available outlet to express these sorts of anxieties and new social soli-
darities. Combining the already existing communal religious infrastructure, 
though small in size, with typical human response during crisis, it is not too 
surprising that religious identities gained popularity in the last decade of the 
twentieth century32. These sentiments are exactly what make El Patronato, 
the Jewish community center in Havana, go beyond its purpose as a house 
of worship to function as a community center and the locus of new kinds of 
religious identities. Such stability, offered by religious communities in Cuba 
amidst the economic and ideological turmoil of the ‘special period,’ attracted 
Cuban-Jews and believers of other faiths back to their communities. 
Religion as a Social and Economic Aid Network
Simultaneously the Cuban government reconsidered its attitudes to-
ward religions – undoubtedly a reaction to popular demand and another way 
for the government to respond to the crisis. By the 1990s, most of Castro’s 
opposition had left the island in a number of migratory waves. The revolu-
tion had stabilized and become a fact of life. Castro’s vision of a new Cuban 
society based on economic equality was closer to becoming a reality. This is 
not to say that no social injustice exists in Cuba while an egalitarian utopia 
does; however, the gaps between the social classes are much smaller nowa-
days. In the 1990s, Cuba’s government was occupied with the task of manag-
ing the painful transition from one international reality to another complete-
ly different one. The national Cuban identity and its proponent, the national 
government, relinquished control to more marginal social forces, such as re-
ligious institutions, thereby creating a social space in which religious iden-
tities could reemerge. The opening of this space for religious institutions to 
function as social aid networks was an act of necessity and desperation on 
the side of the government. 
Furthermore, religious social and economic networks have been instru-
mental both for Cuban citizens and the Cuban government. Individual citi-
zens use religious networks as alternative for other failed or non-existing so-
cial and economic networks such as those previously operated by the gov-
ernment or available under a capitalist ideology. For its part, the government 
– especially during the ‘special period’ – found in the religious networks an 
outside agent that could help relieve pressure without posing a serious ideo-
logical risk. Here a historical shift can be detected. In 1959, religion was high-
ly identified with political power and hence considered a threat to the new 
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revolutionary regime. Forty some years later, combined with global changes 
in the way western society and religion institutions see the role of religion 
in society (i.e., a shift of focus from politics to social aid), religion not only 
stopped being an ideological risk, but also practically became an ally of the 
revolutionary Cuban regime. 
The Youth Organization, Simja (joy) the senior club, and the Feminine 
Association, which are part of the activities offered by El-Patronato, serve 
as an example of the way religion assumed the function of social and eco-
nomic aid network. These organizations provide both general education and 
physical activities in addition to the original Jewish content dedicated to the 
development of the Jewish identity among the members of these organiza-
tions. For example, every Wednesday the members of the Youth Organiza-
tion gather for volleyball with a professional coach hired by the communi-
ty; those who are not so athletic can participate in Rikudim (dances), Israeli 
folk dance. The Feminine Association has a Rikudim group of its own. Simja 
members enjoy bi-weekly sessions of physical education designed especially 
for the needs of the elderly. These organizations inform their members on 
subjects like health, nutrition, and general world developments relating to 
their specific age group. Indeed, the Youth Organization offers a social circle 
for its members including field trips and parties as well as a clean and re-
spectable place in general in which to gather, listen to music, and play games 
such as dominos – Cuba’s favorite pastime. In addition, members receive 
actual material aid; girls get a regular supply of feminine hygiene products. 
Members receive refreshments at the end of the activities, which are free of 
charge and include transportation as necessary. 
It is important to note that in Havana – and more so in Cuba – transpor-
tation is one of the most underdeveloped services. Private vehicles are hard 
to come by and are mainly a legacy from pre-revolutionary times. All other 
vehicles are owned by the state and assigned to a person according to his or 
her position in the occupational hierarchy. Such circumstances do not allow 
for the youth or the elderly to be independent as far as transportation is con-
cerned. In addition, public transportation is unreliable; a trip of twenty min-
utes by car can end up taking an hour to an hour and a half, taking into ac-
count the amount of time one has to wait for the bus – known as the guagua 
in Cuba. Moreover, the guaguas are extremely crowded. The long waits for the 
guaguas mean that, when one does come, the door is “attacked” by the crowds 
that are so tired of waiting that they will do almost anything to squeeze them-
selves into the limited space. All of these circumstances create an unsafe en-
vironment for commuters, especially the elderly, who might find it hard to 
compete with the younger crowds for entrance onto the bus and for seats in it. 
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Thus, it is no wonder that when Simja members are offered a field trip 
that includes transportation, for them it is not only a question of a social mat-
ter but also an actual economic matter, allowing them to move about more 
independently. In addition, the youth organization and Simja try to offer 
their members an extended stay in an out-of-town location every year. In 
these Majanot (camps), participants from all over the island get together for 
three days or so for seminars on Jewish themes as well as lifestyle issues, such 
as health topics. This occasions help foster a Cuban-Jewish identity beyond 
the specific local communities, encouraging feelings of unification. Remem-
bering the transportation problems of availability and cost, this is probably 
the only way the communities from the different parts of the island can come 
together and share their Jewish experience. 
Religious activities of all types are followed by some kind of meal. After 
the Friday night and Saturday morning services, a full meal is served – usu-
ally including chicken, an expensive product in Cuba. For many, specifical-
ly the elderly, such meals are the most nutritious they have throughout the 
week. In addition, all major holidays are celebrated not only by religious and 
social activities, but also by a communal meal. In El Patronato, about sixty to 
seventy people take part in an average weekend meal. On high holidays, at-
tendance may range from 120 to 150 participants. Supplies for the meals are 
paid for from the Jewish Distribution Committee (JDC) delegates’ budget; 
however, the cooperation of the Cuban government is required so that ration 
allocations are granted. This fact imbues the religious services not only with 
religious and social benefits, but also economic benefits. 
As transportation is not a readily available resource in Cuba, at the end 
of the services – at least in Havana, a large metropolitan area in which people 
may live a half hour’s driving distance from the synagogue – transportation is 
offered for no charge and is readily available to the congregants. This fact has 
both economical and social significance. Economically it enables the less for-
tunate, who cannot afford a taxi, to participate in the activities. Socially, both 
the meals and the transportation offered by the community allow a space 
for gathering and social exchange that most likely would not be attainable 
to most of the members of the community. Ultimately, participants create 
social and economic networks with other members of the community and 
with other Jewish communities on the island. Indeed, choosing Jewish be-
came part of the survival strategy in the Cuban reality of the ‘special period’33. 
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Religion as an International Channel of Communication
Although eccentric and unique in today’s world, Cuba is no doubt still 
part of the global system. Obviously, due to its own government ideology and 
the consequential economic embargo imposed by the United States, Cuba is 
disadvantaged in economic and ideological globalization processes. Religion 
provided a way for Cubans to overcome the limitations imposed by politics 
on ties with the international community. Furthermore, religion allowed Cu-
bans to explore aspects of their identity that fell outside the Cuban-socialist 
model without risking open conflict with the socialist government. In this 
regard, religion, in appreciation of its independent international networks, 
serves as an outlet for Cuba from its isolation. In addition, it opened an in-
ternational communication channel for Cubans without exposing them to 
the scrutiny of their own government. Taking into consideration that Cubans 
are not free to travel outside their country as they wish – or even to commu-
nicate with foreigners within Cuba – religious networks offer a legitimizing 
context for such activities. 
Religious missions inside and outside of Cuba are a door to the inter-
national community, which is relatively free of Cuba’s government scruti-
ny. Religious organizations are international organizations, transcending na-
tional division as they have realigned themselves in world politics as social 
movements, working to improve human society, with no national loyalties. 
This national neutrality of religious organizations has made it easier for the 
Cuban government to collaborate with them without risking conflict on an 
ideological plane. 
Most importantly, religion has served as a bridge – a communication 
highway between isolated Cuban citizens both from within and without. 
Packages of knowledge, using Tsing’s term, of global context could be trans-
mitted to the island (both in the geographical and social realms). As part of 
these packages, we can consider an example of a lesson on political systems 
thought at the Sunday school in El-Patronato. 
The lesson took place on a day dedicated to Israeli current affairs (about 
a month before the Israeli election of 2006). The adults had a comprehensive 
debate regarding Israeli politics. At the same time, for the adolescent group, 
whose members are just becoming aware of politics, a basic explanation of 
politics was given. Terms like political parties and right or left wing were clari-
fied. Taking into consideration that this occurred in Havana, Cuba – a coun-




The teacher Dana approached this delicate matter in a very judicious 
manner. A 30-year-old woman and an active member in the community 
since her adolescent years, Dana holds several positions in the community, 
including leader of  religious services, an instructor of the youth group, an 
instructor of Rikudim, and a Sunday school teacher. She first presented the 
Cuban political system, with which the participants were familiar. She then 
presented a multi-party system and defined what right and left referred to, 
placing both socialism and capitalism along the spectrum. Eventually, Dana 
presented the major parties involved in the 2006 Israeli election and tried to 
place them on a right-left spectrum. Throughout this lesson, the youth were 
reminded that knowledge is crucial in identifying with a party or an ideolo-
gy and that, with time, they would gather enough information to form their 
own personal opinions and locate themselves along the political spectrum.
Such knowledge of secular character can be transmitted in the Cuban 
locality thanks to a religious network. Furthermore, the information can be 
interpreted and adapted to the local circumstances, such as the need to in-
troduce students to multi-party political systems since the Cuban political 
system is comprised of a single political party. Another more concrete ex-
ample of knowledge passed through the religious network would be the com-
puter courses provided through the community operated ORT center, again 
knowledge that is categorized as secular. 
ORT center offers two types of courses: technological, which differ in 
levels, and non-technological (mainly language classes). Every course is of-
fered free of charge as a service to the community. The ORT technological 
center allows the members of the community access to technological instruc-
tion and equipment that is otherwise difficult to acquire in Cuba. It allows 
the members of the community and others to gain access to computer tech-
nology and the English language, and thus, to participate more actively in 
global communication networks. In this case, a religious institution has tak-
en upon itself a non-religious task since, in the Cuban locality it is one of the 
only ways in which this knowledge can reach the average Cuban.
The Israeli folk dances Rikudim are an important vehicle used by the 
JDC to develop and maintain a Jewish identity among communities in the di-
aspora. They are another example of knowledge being transmitted bypassing 
political screens. Rikudim are learned through the instruction of a certified 
Israeli folk dance teacher who comes to the island for four to five days every 
three months. He or she teaches the choreography and brings new music to 
the Rikudim instructors of the communities – in this case, all from the Ha-
vana community. 
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According to Dov – the JDC’s Israeli folk dance teacher – the most sig-
nificant aspect of his work is the use of the Rikudim as an educational de-
vice. Rikudim, including the music, lyrics, and choreography, contribute to 
the identification of the communities in the diaspora with the state of Israel. 
One obvious form of identification is the Hebrew language, but there are oth-
ers to consider – for instance, the familiarity with musical trends in Israel. 
Through the lyrics, listeners learn what issues occupy the minds of Israeli art-
ists as well as how these issues are similar or different from the ones Cuban 
artists explore. In this way, Rikudim serve as an international bridge through 
which knowledge pertaining to current world Jewry can be transmitted and 
adapted in different localities.
Here is an example to the ways Rikudim brought about new knowl-
edge. One afternoon I was asked to translate one of the favorite dance songs 
of the young children (ages four to twelve). Through the translation of an Is-
raeli Hip Hop song, the children and their teachers became familiar with, not 
only, the slang used in current Hebrew, but also some of the cultural context 
I explained in order for the words to make sense. The fact that the song was 
of the Hip Hop genre contributed to its popularity among the youth. As such, 
Hebrew – and through it, Israel – became more accessible to them. 
Rikudim are used to create a connection not only with Israel, but also 
with other communities of the diaspora and even among the communities 
in Cuba. In March 2006, the Emuna group, the dance group of the commu-
nity of Havana, with a couple of dancers from other communities on the is-
land, traveled to Mexico to participate in the Aviv (spring) dance festival, an 
Israeli folk dance competition among the Mexican-Jewish communities. It 
was a unique opportunity for the members of the Cuban-Jewish community 
to interact with other Jews of the diaspora as well as travel outside of Cuba. 
Thus, Rikudim serve as a both physical and mental bridge to the global Jew-
ish community.
Another such physical and mental bridge to the rest of the Jewish dias-
pora is the yearly Taglit (discovery) program, also known as the Birth Right 
program. This program gathers Jewish youth from all over the world in Is-
rael for two weeks in spring to give them the opportunity to meet with other 
Jewish youth from around the world and experience the Jewish state. In the 
Cuban case, since the community does not have the funds to send its own 
youth, the Canadian Jewish congregation subsidizes the Cuban participants 
in the yearly expedition. Only members of the community who have been 
participating regularly for at least two years are eligible to participate in the 
program. The Taglit program aims to evoke feelings of identification and be-
longing among the different Jewish communities around the globe and to 
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the Jewish state. The one place that evoked the strongest emotions in those 
Cuban-Jews who have visited Israel as part of Taglit was the Western Wall – 
the last relic from the ancient temple in Jerusalem, echoing the status of Is-
rael as the holy land and a connecting thread through two thousand years 
of Jewish history. 
These travel opportunities and the added value of interaction with Jews 
outside of Cuba are priceless opportunities. Cuban-Jews are able to acquire 
knowledge of Jewish relevance – both directly and indirectly – that other-
wise would not be available to them. Through such activities, along with ed-
ucation and religious missions, the universality of religion serves as a com-
munication channel opening a path between Cubans and the international 
community. 
Primordial and Instrumental Perspectives on Identity
Members of the Cuban-Jewish community have a primordialist ap-
proach to their Jewishness, having a firm belief in who they are – that it is 
just destined to be so. During the interviews, several members of the com-
munity referred to their Jewish ancestry as an unquestionable state. Ab, a 
twenty-year-old male who grew up in a non-Jewish environment, is Jewish 
through his father, but not his mother. Three years ago, Ab was introduced 
to the Jewish community by his cousin, who brought him to the synagogue 
to celebrate Rosh Hashanah (the Jewish New Year). In recalling how he told 
his family that he had decided to practice Judaism and be part of the com-
munity in Havana, Ab stated: “…I told them that I am going to be Jewish be-
cause this is what I was born, born in reality.” Meanwhile, Alon – a 24-year-
old male member of El Patronato – is a Jew through his mother’s side of the 
family. Although he knew of his Jewish heritage throughout his life, he nei-
ther participated in nor knew of the existence of the community until three 
years before his interview. When asked what it meant for him to be Jewish, 
he responded: “… being part of the Jewish community worldwide is some-
thing that makes me feel that I do belong there … even if I did not want to, 
I was a member of it…” Another interviewee, Moti – a self-proclaimed Cu-
ban-Jewish painter and a central figure in the Santiago de Cuba community 
– was raised in a Jewish home in which his aunt continually maintained a 
kosher lifestyle. Moti commented: “…we are like this [Jewish] because our 
grandparents were like this and our great grandparents were like that – all 
the way back. We are like this so we have to keep on being who we are, we 
cannot change.”  
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The Jews interviewed in Cuba expressed primordialist convictions. I in 
contrast came to see their Jewish identities through an instrumentalist lens. 
This is not to negate their primordial perception; however, instrumentalism 
is crucial in this case and should be pointed out even if it is not recognized 
by the subjects themselves. The Jewish association in a member’s life played 
a major role in the motivation for the revitalization of the community. The 
first resource to be tapped into when the community reestablished itself was 
the Passover rations lists, an instrumental part of life that evidently was the 
strongest link to Judaism among the Jews left on the island after the revolu-
tion. The Passover ration lists recorded all those who were affiliated with the 
community and thus were entitled for special food rations to facilitate the 
holiday celebrations. 
In addition, membership was instrumental in escaping the poor pros-
pects offered by the crumbling Cuban economy through immigration to Is-
rael, thus serving as an international channel of communication not only 
through education and travel opportunities, but also through immigration. 
By choosing to identify themselves as Jews, community members found pos-
itive resources to augment their lives. They reciprocated by investing their 
time and emotions back into the community. 
Conclusion
The social frames within which the communal activities take place, the 
organizations operating in the community such as Simja, ORT, the Sunday 
school, and even the close connection between the JDC and the Cuban-Jew-
ish community are all relics from the old community; all were reestablished 
with the revival of the community. Although the vessels for group organiza-
tion have remained the same, their content has been refreshed and modified. 
The criteria for group belonging has undergone similar changes. Familial re-
lations through blood and marriage are still the mediums that set group be-
longing; however, within these categories, the exact thresholds have shifted 
over time. 
The revitalization of religious life in Cuba at the time of the ‘special pe-
riod’ was no coincidence. Although the socialist revolution excluded reli-
gion from Cuba’s social life, Castro – Cuba’s president since 1959 – has been 
in communication with religious leaders in Latin America since the 1970s34. 
When historical circumstances – namely, the collapse of the Eastern Bloc – 
presented the need, Castro and the revolutionary government opened Cu-
ban society to the operation of religious organizations. Thus, during the ‘spe-
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cial period,’ religious organizations came to function as a social pivot around 
which communities emerged in response to crisis. Religious identities be-
came instrumental in everyday life serving both as social and economic aid 
networks. 
In addition, religions also serve as international communication chan-
nels. The religious international channel works to and from Cuba. Religion 
legitimizes communication with outsiders within Cuba, where the govern-
ment discourages its citizens from interacting with foreigners. Meanwhile, 
religious missions are one of the few ways in which United States citizens 
could interact and even visit Cuba throughout almost five decades of eco-
nomic embargo. In other words, religions and their global institutions serve 
as platform for Cubans to engage in international relations outside the na-
tional framework. 
The religious revival in Cuba should be contextualized within world 
trends. A pendulum-like motion of influence from global to local and vice 
versa can be observed. Local events in Cuba (i.e., the revolution of 1959 and 
the subsequent interactions with religions) were part of the global secular-
ization trends in the west. Meanwhile, global events such as globalization 
and the shifts in world powers (e.g., the collapse of the Eastern Bloc) have 
brought about change in religiosity in the Cuban locality. Such changes have 
augmented a global trend of religious intensification around the world. Al-
though Cuba’s own historical events have contributed largely to the revital-
ization of religious movements in the country, this process is part of a global 
trend in which religiosity regains social, and as a result, political power. 
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